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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to determine the extent of anti-corruption information disclosure in the 
sustainability reports originating from Gulf countries. Focus primarily on the fight against 
corruption, this study utilizes a deeply-rooted content analysis technique of corporate 
sustainability reporting, covering 66 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) firms during 2014. 
Strengthened by the application of institutional theory, insight into the results points to a state of 
limited maturity regarding the disclosure of anti-corruption procedures in the region. More 
specifically, the results highlight the compliance in the reporting of conduct code, while 
reporting information on whistle-blowing was significantly less in comparison. Firms in Qatar 
and UAE ultimately release better informed reports; inclusive of detailed information on internal 
anti-corruption practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Anti-corruption disclosure, Sustainability reports, GCC, Arabian Gulf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60 
Journal of Financial Crime Page 2 of 17 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Across the business community, corruption remains a monumental challenge, particularly within 
developing nations. Corporate corruption has been known to undermine economic development, 
corrode civil society and diminish democratic accountability. Corroborated by the numerous 
internationally criminalized corporate scandals over the previous decade, awareness of this issue 
continues to rise, albeit at uneven rates (ERIS, 2005). Recent scandals of Xerox, Enron, 
WorldCom and Lehman Brothers have forced the attention of policy makers and governments 
towards the development of more restrictive anti-corruption policies. According to United 
Nations Global Compact (2006), corruption has been recognized as one of the world’s greatest 
challenges. Corrupt practices have been known to ultimately robs the already disadvantage 
population; diverting resources for essential services (education, clean water, and health care) 
into the purses of corrupt officials (Hills et al. 2009). 
 
Through the literature, various definitions have been used to explain such acts of greed. 
However, throughout this analysis the explanation put-forward by Argandoña (2005) with the 
point of reference regarding corruption: “The act or effect of giving or receiving a thing of value, 
in order that a person do or omit to do something, in violation of a formal or implicit rule about 
what that person ought to do or omit to do, to the benefit of the person who gives the thing of 
value or a third party” (Argandoña, 2005, p. 252). 
 
Representing a major social issue around the world, corruption is any misuse of power and 
position for private gain while damaging organizational integrity (UN Global Compact 2006). 
Through acts of bribery, overestimated project budgets, legal and/or other expenses, corruption is 
estimated to incur a global cost of $2.6 trillion. As a result, corporations are constantly 
encouraged to avoid all forms of corrupt practices, to maximize operational efficiency and 
maintain a good social reputation. That is, increase anti-corruption practices through a strategic 
lens focused on corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Hills et al. 2009). The harmful effects of 
corruption are incompatible with sustainable development, Branco and Matos (2016) thus argues 
that the prevention of corruption is an integral part of any organization’s CSR 
 
Anti-corruption activities are provided under the social category in sustainability reporting 
guidelines-Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. According to the guidelines for 2014, an 
organization’s sustainability report should include anti-corruption policies and procedures 
implemented in the organization training program on anti-corruption practices, as well as the 
total number of operations used to assess corruption related risks. 
 
Organizations should report any incidents of corruption and the actions taken. Sustainability 
reporting guidelines are commonly based on three pillars: economic, environmental, and social. 
This report conveys information related to an organization’s impact (positive or negative) on the 
environment, society and the economy. The guidelines further assert the adoption of robust 
corporate governance system that counters financial statement fraud, corruption and money 
laundering activities. Good corporate governance has been identified as important way to curtail 
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such activities. Firms, posited by Rose-Ackerman et al. (2012), need to push towards a self-
fulfilling cycle of good governance to promote the efficacy of anti-corruption practices. 
Osuagwu (2012) adds that governance system designed to fight corruption should be built to 
reach effectiveness and improve performance. 
 
Currently, laws which exist within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries prohibit any 
acts of bribery. The violation of these laws are accompanied by criminal fines and or periods of 
imprisonment for both parties involved; those who offer the bribe, as well as for the local official 
receiving. Gifts in any form, hospitality, or entertainment can constitute a bride and therefore 
forbidden under the laws of the GCC states; if influential to an official’s decisions (Jones Day, 
2013). The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published on an annual basis by Transparency 
International (TI), in 2015, ranks all GCC states. A review of this index reveals that Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) both enjoy better rankings compare with other GCC states. 
Qatar was labelled the least corrupt country, ranking 22
nd
 on a global scale, followed by UAE, 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman have CPI ranking of 23
rd
, 48
th
, 50
th
, 55
th
 and 60
th
, 
respectively. 
 
Heightened by this ranking, the aim of this study is to determine the extent of sustainability 
reporting in GCC companies under coercive isomorphism concept; with a special interest in the 
disclosure of anti-corruption practices. Ultimately, addressing the following questions: To what 
extent the GCC companies disclose their anti-corruption practices in the sustainability reports? 
What areas of anti-corruption disclosure the GCC is more concern in their sustainability reports? 
To what extent do external forces under coercive isomorphism explain the extent of anti-
corruption disclosure? 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section will provide a review of 
the existing literature relevant to the research. This will be followed by theoretical framework. 
Section 4 provides a description of the methodological process. Section 5 provides the results 
and discussion followed by conclusive remarks of the study in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There is little research in literature on the anti-corruption practices disclosure as an integral part 
of CSR themes or sustainability reporting for firms (Rodriguez et al. 2006; Dissanayake et al. 
2011; Ho & Lin, 2012 and Branco & Matos, 2016). 
 
In 2006, Wilkinson (2006) notes that anti-corruption information by firms does not have the 
lengthy reporting history compared with ecological issues. However, the lack such discourse by 
firms due to reporting on anti-corruption presents practical difficulties. Corruption by its very 
nature is secretive, complex, hidden and or viewed as sensitive by firms, yet it does not carry the 
same emotive weight as other social issues. In an effort to evaluate managers’ perception toward 
anti-corruption practices and reporting, Gordon and Wynhoven (2003) examined the top 100 
non-financial multinational firms’ websites listed in United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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Development's (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2002. The authors reported that only 43% 
published anti-corruption material on their websites, while 95% disclosed environment related 
information. They also found that the propensities to disclose anti-corruption practices where 
based on the country of location and or the sector. 
 
Resulting in similar findings, Healy and Serafeim (2014) used TI’s scoring index of anti-
corruption reporting on 480 firms to investigate whether their disclosures reflect firms’ real 
efforts to fight corruption or are “cheap talk”. They found that ratings of firms’ anti-corruption 
practices reporting are predictably related to strong enforcement, such as home country laws and 
regulations, industry corruption risk, U.S. listing, Big Four auditors, and have greater board 
independence. In KPMG (2005) surveyed, exceeding 1600 annual reports, of the world’s largest 
firms in 2005, reported that 61% of the firms included a section on corporate governance, but 
only 18% included policies for bribery or corruption. 
 
In further efforts to evaluate perception to combating this negative practice, TI (2009) examined 
the sustainability reports, annual reports and websites of the Fortune 500 world's largest leading 
corporations. It is found that while firms may often disclose high-level strategic commitments to 
fight corruption, they are less likely to disclose information on the necessary support systems 
required to meet these commitments. Day and Chambers (2011) analyzed the annual reports of 
twenty FTSE 100 firms over a two year period (2007-2008) in terms of bribery and corruption 
reporting. They found additional evidence which indicated the absence of accountability from 
firms in regard to bribery and corruption information disclosures. 
 
Hess (2009) stated that reporting on the effectiveness of anti-corruption practices by the firm 
serves multiple organizational goals. First, it provides accountability. Second, it raises high level 
of public awareness and makes pressure on other firms to adopt the principles. Third, reporting 
on anti-corruption also serves the goal of organizational learning. Through disclosure, firms can 
begin to learn from the experiences of others' anti-corruption efforts and adopt best practices. 
Reporting on the effectiveness of anti-corruption provides indications that firms are taking 
responsibility for their employees’ behavior and that they acknowledge the negative 
consequences to their reputation. There is proliferation of guidelines and initiatives for 
organizations to following, which can assist with reporting efforts geared towards combating 
bribery and corruption: such include TI, FTSE4Good Index Series, UN Global Compact and GRI 
(ACCA 2008). 
 
In 2012, Hoi and Lin (2012) investigated the development of CSR framework in Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), one of the largest semiconductor industries in 
the world, and its association with anti-corruption activities. It was concluded that there exist a 
positive relationship between firm's anti-corruption program and its commitment to CSR. 
Furthermore, the authors found that CSR undermines corporate corruption in two ways: through 
extrinsic regulations such as such as bureaucratic controls, codes of conduct, and legal and 
regulatory sanctions that emphasize surveillance and penalty, and or intrinsic motivations such as 
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such as company values, organizational ethics, and self-controls that emphasize integrity and 
self-monitoring. Branco (2016) analyzed the 2009 sustainability reports of Portuguese firms to 
understand the disclosure practices. He concluded that firms with a high level of corruption risk 
and firms in association with the UN Global Compact seem to show greater concern to improve 
corporate image through anti-corruption reporting. 
 
In context of the GCC and the Middle East, a void remains for studies examining the level of 
anti-corruption practices reporting. According to the CPI in 2015, issued by the TI, Qatar has 
ranked as "cleanest" of the GCC, it ranked 22nd and the UAE followed at 24. While the other 
GCC countries have higher serious corruption ranking, Saudi Arabia was ranked 48, Bahrain 
followed at 50, Kuwait was ranked 55 and Oman was placed 60. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Institutional theory is a widely accepted. The theory states that institutions are deeply embedded 
in wider institutional and environmental structures, thus institutional practices are often either 
direct reflection of, or responses to, rules and structures built into their wider environments 
(Powell 1998; Scott, 2005). According to Scott and Meyer (1994), institutions are symbolic and 
behavioral systems containing representational, constitutional, and normative rules together with 
regulatory mechanisms that define a common meaning system and give rise to distinctive actors 
and action routines. 
 
Across the body of academic literature, institutional theory has been employed in several studies 
to understand accounting practices and reporting. Examples include, case-mix accounting 
choices, budgeting, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) adoption, sustainability 
reporting, and financial reporting (see Mezias 1990; Covaleski et al. 1993; Carpenter & Feroz, 
2001; Campbell, 2007; Joseph et al. 2015). The institutional theory posits that in order to 
survive, organizations must conform to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the 
environment, this behavior is called institutional isomorphism (Scott, 1994). Hawley (1968) 
define “isomorphism” as the constraining process that obliges one unit in a population to 
resemble other unites that face the same set of environmental characteristics, while DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) later provide a more narrow definition – it is the likelihood of organizations to 
adopt the same structures and practices. 
 
Legitimacy is a major organization’s need that comes from institutional isomorphism, according 
to Meyer and Rowan (1977), organizations mimic the structure and practices defined by 
prevailing rationalized concepts of an institutionalized society. The Institutional theory has 
numerous similarities with the legitimacy theory; organizations strive to increase efficiency by 
achieving some ‘fit’ between environmental condition and structure, but the objective of 
efficiency is a result from organization’s need to legitimize itself (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Meyer and Zucker, 1989; Brignall & Modell, 2000). Greenwood & Hinings (1996) state that 
organizations conform to contextual expectations in order to promote legitimacy and rise their 
probability of survival. 
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According to Dimaggio and Powell (1983), three varying mechanisms exist through which 
institutional isomorphism occurs; coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism is 
used to clarify the institutional environment in the fight against corruption (Joseph et al. 2015). 
Coercive isomorphism in itself is driven by two forces - the response to pressures from 
organizations such as a government and key dependent affiliates, and the pressure to adapt to 
cultural expectations of larger society (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; 
Radaelli, 2000). This concept originated from the influence of government regulation, law and 
the external environment; resulting from both formal and informal pressures exerted by 
organizations of which the particular organization is dependent (Amran & Devi 2008). These 
pressures may be in the form of forces, persuasions or invitations to collude. 
 
In relation to the anti-corruption activities adopted by the international corporation, Rodriguez et 
al. (2005) mentioned that in a host country, which forbids corrupt behaviors, International 
Corporation complies with their institutional environment and adopts the same norms and 
practices in order to create acceptance by government. While in other countries, International 
Corporation becomes isomorphic with a pervasively corrupt; complying with forces to pay 
bribes, engage in other illegal activities, in efforts to gain legitimacy support. 
 
The coercive pressure used in this paper presents the regulations and laws imposed by the 
regulatory authorities; regarded as the external formal body that forces organizations to adopt 
anti-corruption practices and to disclose anti-corruption activities in their sustainability reports. 
Coercive isomorphism approach has been widely used by other studies, including (Carpenter & 
Feroz, 2001; Joseph and Taplin, 2011; Joseph et al., 2015). 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
The Content Analysis approach used have been applied in previous studies to collect anti-
corruption information from annual reports and examine the level of disclosure (Dissanayake et 
al., 2011; Joseph et al., 2015; Branco & Matos, 2016). Content Analysis is a technique of 
codifying the text of a piece of writing into groups based on selected criteria (Weber, 1990; 
Guthrie and Abeysekera, 2006). Following prior studies (Dissanayake et al., 2011 and Joseph et 
al., 2015), this study uses dichotomous scales of measurement of the availability of thematic 
disclosure (index measures) in order to capture the desired information. 
 
This comprehensive approach to examining the level of anti-corruption disclosure evaluates 
using seven general themes, of 40 sub-categories. The general themes include: (1) Accounting 
for combatting bribery; (2) Board and Senior Management responsibility; (3) Building human 
resources to combat bribery; (4) Responsible business relationships; (5) External verification 
and assurance; (6) Codes of Conduct; and (7) Whistle-blowing. 
 
The sustainability annual reports of GCC firms reported in 2014 were evaluated. These reports 
were primarily obtained from the Global Reporting database with others source through the 
individual firm’s website. The sample consists of 66 GCC firms disclosing sustainability reports 
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according to GRI, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
The UN Global Compact guidelines. The sample also included firms not referring to any 
guidelines of reporting. Collectively, data was gathered from 8 Saudi firms, 5 Oman firms, 5 
Kuwait firms, 1 Bahrain firm, 31 Emirates firms and 16 Qatar firms. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
The results of this analysis are presented in the Figure 1 and Appendix 1. Category 1 presents the 
number of items listed in the annual and sustainability reports for combating bribery. Notably, all 
of GCC firms provide information regarding the combatting bribery (item 9); indicating concerns 
with the process of the internal control systems. The majority of firms omit information on the 
facilitation of payment prohibitions and number of employee dismissal (items 7 and 12). 
Dissimilar, the disclosure of such information was without concern for 1 Saudi firm, 4 UAE 
firms and 1 Oman firm. The sample appears to have committed to disclosing charitable 
contribution and sponsorship (item 6); a measure of the organization’s charitable efforts. 
 
Under Category 2, insight into the responsibilities of board members and senior management is 
gained. According to the data, the GCC made considerable efforts to disclose much less 
information on whether dialogue between NGOs and the public, to promote their anti-corruption 
program, exists. Limited information was also recorded regarding the existence of independent 
assessment of the program by audit committees (items 6 and 7). This is a possible indicator that 
few firms collaborate with third parties entities to improve anti-corruption policies; paying less 
attention to the assessment process of their anti-corruption program. 
 
Category 3 provides statistics regarding building human resources to combat bribery; a signal 
that firms are reporting on human resources practices and commitments (item 1) - a commitment 
level exceeding 80%. This was closely followed by item 2, information on development of 
human resources policies with the assistance of trade unions and consultation with employees. 
Only 1 Kuwaiti was excluded from the list of countries not listed under item 2. Category 4 
illustrates the reporting on responsible business relationships. The results of items 1 and 6, which 
include information on monitoring the performance of joint ventures and conducting the 
procurement practices, were disclosed by approximately 37% of GCC firms. However, the 
information on the remaining items was disclosed by every firm. Largely, the GCC firms show 
less awareness on the external business relations and communications. 
 
Category 5 demonstrates the disclosure on external verification and assurance. It indicates that a 
larger portion of GCC firms commits to the full disclosure on the provision of assurance 
statements (item 3). However, reporting on external verification or assurance of anti-corruption 
program was provided by UAE firms. Category 6 illustrates the disclosure on codes of conduct. 
It indicates that the majority of GCC firms reported on the codes of conduct in a good manner 
among their stakeholders (3 items). Category 7 also includes a shortened list of GCC firms, 
which disclosed adequate information on the existence and implementation of whistle-blowing 
system. Bahrain firms were completely excluded from the list. 
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Also gathered from Figure 1, is the GCC firms intent level to disclose the highest amount of 
information on category (6) - Codes of Conduct; category (3) - Building Human Resources to 
Combat Bribery and category (2) - Board and Senior Management Responsibilities. Minimum 
disclosure was on category (7) Whistle-Blowing. GCC firms display great concern regarding the 
code of conduct and communicating their business ethics with employees. This demonstrates a 
proposal to safeguard business profits and professional ethics, while ensuring the firm continues 
to uphold high standards of ethical behavior in the business operations. However, the 
whistleblowing system of disclosure by GCC firms requires significant attention despite the 
assistance offered to governments by international anti-corruption groups, such as TI. 
 
Suggested in the results, UAE and Qatar firms were more inclined to engage in sustainability 
reports compare with firms from other GCC countries. This is consistent with the finds of the 
Centre for Sustainability and Excellence’s (CSE) research on sustainability reporting in Middle 
East region (2014); where the country capturing the most sustainability reports in the period 
2012-2014 was UAE (34%), followed by Qatar (22%). The other countries were represented by 
small groups of firms. Saudi Arabia and Oman had a small group of firms concerned with 
sustainability reporting, despite a high public awareness levels through several events held. This 
indicates a clear gap between the level of awareness and practice, coupled with a lack of 
enforcement by local governments. 
 
Regarding coercive isomorphism, an accurate comparison of best practices between UAE and 
Qatar firms and others (in Saudi, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain) is impractical, due to the wide gap 
which exists between reporting habits. There is an absence of strict formal regulations and rules 
in other countries, which obligate firms to build a sound anti-corruption system. Furthermore, 
coercive isomorphism is more evident in UAE and Qatar, with global ranking for the two 
countries improving annually
1
. UAE and Qatar are noted with the least corruption among the 
GCC nations, justified by the significant progression in adherence of good corporate governance. 
Regulatory authorities in the both countries have imposed significant initiatives to enhance the 
corporate governance practices and fight against corruption, when matched against the other 
GCC countries. Additionally, the formal pressure by regulators in Qatar and UAE is 
demonstrated through the implementation and development of corporate governance system that 
inevitably results in enhancement of anti-corruption practices. 
 
UAE and Qatar governments have shown commitment efforts in their fight against corruption. 
Various mechanisms have been advanced toward this effort; including, ratifying the UN 
convention on corruption, signing the Arab Anti-corruption and Integrity Network. The UAE has 
also appointed a federal body to oversee the use of public funds – the State Audit Institution 
(SAI). Following UN anti-corruption recommendations, in 2011 the SAI issued a guide on best 
practices focused on anti-corruption and fraudulent activities (All & Bose, 2015). The Qatar 
 
 
 
1 For example, in 2012, the both of Qatar and UAE had the 68th and they needed just two years to have the 
better global ranking.
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Financial Market Authority (QFMA) established a corporate governance code in 2009, based on 
international standards set forth by OECD, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the 
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) and the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF). The corporate governance code has been amended several times in the latter years to match 
the sustainability goals of Qatar’s National Vision 20302. 
 
The implementation of anti-corruption systems is favorable to a firm’s corporate image and 
reputation. Alternatively, a firm considered to be involved in corrupt or fraudulent activities is 
expected to receive a negative outlook. Consequently, the limited number of firms which engage 
in sustainable reporting and anti-corruption practices, in Saudi, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain, tend 
to be more visible to the public while maintaining a positive reputation. Furthermore, the high 
level of public awareness particularly in Saudi Arabia and Oman requires a response from firms 
to maintain their legitimacy and to explain their commitment to the community through good 
governance and reporting (Suchman, 1995). It is worth-of-note that CSR reporting by Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain firms are primarily focused on charitable philanthropic 
activities. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) previously postulated that firms with foundations and 
give more to charity, are likely to have a higher positive reputation. 
 
 
Figure 1: Anti-corruption disclosure  
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Category 1: Accounting for combatting bribery.  
Category 2: Board and senior management responsibilities.  
Category 3: Building human resources to combat bribery. 
Category 4: Responsible business relationships.  
Category 5: External verification and assurance.  
Category 6: Codes of conduct. 
Category 7: Whistle-blowing. 
 
According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), Isomorphism forces may be a result of the several 
corporate governance incentives and rewards granted to firms as a result of the adoption of best  
 
2 Qatar’s National Vision 2030 is a development plan launched in October 2008 by the General Secretariat for 
Development Planning in the State of Qatar. The aim of QNV 2030 is to transform Qatar into an advanced society 
capable of achieving sustainable development by 2030.
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practices
3
. With regard to institutional theory, conformance to the ceremonial measurement 
criteria has also proven useful to organization. It legitimizes the organization with internal 
participants, stockholders, the society and the regulatory bodies, demonstrating socially the 
fitness of an organization. High ceremonial values help the organization to boost its legitimacy 
consequently loans, donations or investments are more easily to be obtained. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This study assesses the level of sustainable reporting performance on combating corruption 
under the coercive isomorphism concept, in efforts to understand the anti-corruption systems, 
strategies and policies of GCC firms according to 2014 data. GCC firms disclosed the highest 
amount of information under the category (6) Codes of Conduct, while the category (7) Whistle-
Blowing has the least disclosure. 
 
Although there has been a significant increase in the importance of anti-corruption reporting as a 
means of reducing corruption, globally. The study finds that anti-corruption disclosure in GCC 
region has yet to reach a high or maturity level. Interpreted through the lens of institutional 
theory, the regulatory authorities are coercively pressured to fight corruption in GCC region. 
Firms in Qatar and UAE notably abide by the rules set by the regulatory authorities to disclose 
anti-corruption information. The sustainable developments in Qatar and UAE required enacting 
laws to follow the global trend of efforts in improving the sustainability. These firms in the both 
countries release more detailed anti-corruption information than other countries in GCC region. 
Furthermore, evidence suggest an increasing trend in GCC to include more anti-corruption 
information. 
 
Conclusively, the growth in sustainability reporting within GCC countries was justified under the 
institutional theory - legitimacy is an essential organization’s need that comes from institutional 
isomorphism. Thus, the GCC firms attempt to present a socially responsible image through their 
reports in order to increase legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders. Despite the present 
increasing trend, only a small percentage of reports remain fully compliant with the respective 
rule of law. 
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Appendix 
 
Category 1: Accounting for combatting bribery. 
     
Saudi 
    
Oman 
    
Kuwait 
   
Bahrain 
   
Emirates 
 
Qatar 
   
                       
  Accounting for combatting bribery   n: 8     n: 5     n: 5    n: 1    n: 31     n: 16    
     Tota  %   Tota  %   Tota  %   Tota  %   Tota  %   Tota  %  
     l     l     l     l     l     l    
1  The company prohibits all forms of  5  62.5  4  80   4  80   1  100   25  80.6  11  68.8 
  bribery whether they take place directly                               
  or through third parties.                               
2  The company prohibits its employees 4 50  3 60  1  20  1  100  18 58.1  10 62.5  
  from soliciting, arranging or accepting                               
  bribes intended for the employee's                               
  benefit or that of the employee's family,                               
  friends, associates or acquaintances.                               
3  The company, its employees or agents  3  37.5  0 0   0  0   1  100   5  16.1 0  0.0  
  make clear commitments that they do not                               
  have direct or indirect contributions to                               
  political parties, organizations or                               
  individuals engaged in politics, as a way                               
  of obtaining advantages in business                               
  transactions.                               
4  The company discloses all its political 0 0  1 20  0  0  1  100  4 12.9  0 0.0  
  contributions.                               
                       
5  The company ensures that charitable  1  12.5  1  20   2  40   1  100   1  3.2   0  0.0  
  contribution and sponsorship are not used                               
  as a subterfuge for bribery.                               
6  The company publicly discloses all its 5 62.5  3 60  1  20  1  100  22 71.0  14 87.5  
  charitable contribution and sponsorship.                               
                       
7  The company does not make facilitation  0  0   1  20   0  0   0  0   4  12.9  0  0.0  
  payments and takes the initiative to                               
  identify and eliminate them.                               
8  The company prohibits the offer or 2 25  1 20  1  20  1  100  13 41.9  7 43.8  
  receipt of gifts, hospitality or expenses                               
  whenever they could affect or be                               
  perceived to affect the outcome of                               
  business transactions and are not                               
  reasonable and bona fide.                               
9  The company establishes and maintains  4  50   5 100   4  80   1  100   24  77.4 15  93.8 
  an effective system of internal control to                               
  counter bribery, comprising financial and                               
  organizational checks and balances over                               
  the enterprise's accounting and record                               
  keeping practices and other business                               
  processes related to the program.                               
10  The company subjects the internal 5 62.5  3 60  2  40  1  100  16 51.6  5 31.3  
  control systems, in particular accounting                               
  and record keeping practices, to regular                               
  review and audit to provide assurance on                               
  their design, implementation and                               
  effectiveness.                               
11  Discloses the number of violations.  5 62.5  1 20  3  60  1  100  8 25.8  3 18.8  
                                  
12  Reports the number of dismissals of 1 12.5  0 0  0  0  0  0  0 0  0 0.0  
  employees.                               
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Category 2: Board and senior management responsibilities. 
      
Saudi 
    
Oman 
    
Kuwait 
   
Bahrain 
   
Emirates 
 
Qatar 
   
                        
   Board and senior management   n: 8     n: 5     n: 5    n: 1    n: 31     n: 16    
   responsibilities   
Tot
a  %   
Tot
a  %   
Tot
a  %   Tota  %   Tota  %   Tota  %  
      l     l     l     l     l     l    
1   The board of directors or equivalent body  2   25   4   80   4   80   1   100  26   83.8   8   50  
   should commit to an anti-corruption                                     
   policy and program based on business                                     
   principles and provide leadership,                                     
   resources and active support for the                                     
   management's implementation of the                                     
   program.                                     
2   The company makes compliance with the 2  25  2  40  3   60  1   100 7  22.5  0  0  
   program mandatory for directors and                                     
   applies appropriate sanctions for                                     
   violations of its program.                                     
                              
3   The company establishes feedback  4   50   5   100   4   80   1   100  14   45.1   9   56.2 
   mechanisms and other internal processes                                     
   supporting the continuous improvement                                     
   of the program.                                     
4   Senior management of the company 6  75  5  100  3   60  1   100 20  64.5  15  93.7  
   monitors the program and periodically                                     
   reviews the program's sustainability,                                     
   adequacy and effectiveness, and                                     
   implements improvements as                                     
   appropriate.                                     
5   Senior management should periodically  5   62.5  3   60   1   20   1   100  11   35.4   3   18.7 
   report the results of the program review                                     
   to the audit committee, board or                                     
   equivalent body.                                     
6   Management offers dialogue with the 2  25  2  40  0   0  1   100 11  35.4  0  0  
   NGOs and public so as to promote its                                     
   awareness of and cooperation with the                                     
   fight against bribery and extortion.                                     
7   The audit committee, the board or an  1   12.5  0   0   1   20   1   100  1   3.2   0   0  
   equivalent body should make an                                     
   independent assessment of the adequacy                                     
   of the program and disclose its findings                                     
   in the enterprise's annual report to                                     
   shareholders.                                     
 
Category 3: Building human resources to combat bribery. 
      
Saudi 
    
Oman 
    
Kuwait 
   
Bahrain 
   
Emirates 
 
Qatar 
   
                        
   Building human resources to combat   n: 8     n: 5     n: 5    n: 1    n: 31     n: 16    
   bribery   
Tot
a  %   
Tot
a  %   
Tot
a  %   Tota  %   Tota  %   Tota  %  
      l     l     l     l     l     l    
1   Human resources practices including  8   100   5   100   4   80   1   100   29   93.5   15   93.7 
   recruitment, promotion, training,                                     
   performance evaluation, remuneration                                     
   and recognition should reflect the                                     
   companies' commitment to the program.                                     
2   The human resources policies and 2  25  4  80  5   100  0   0  20  64.5  12  75  
   practices relevant to the program are                                     
   developed and undertaken in consultation                                     
   with employees, trade unions or other                                     
   employee representative bodies as                                     
   appropriate.                                     
3   The company makes it clear that no  0   0   1   20   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  
   employee will suffer demotion, penalty                                     
   or other adverse consequences for                                     
   refusing to pay bribes even if such refusal                                     
   may result in the enterprise losing the                                     
   business.                                     
4   Reports the percentages of employees 1  12.5  1  20  3   60  1   100  8  25.8  1  6.25  
   trained in the organization's anti-                                     
   corruption policies and procedures.                                     
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Category 4: Responsible business relationships. 
      
Saudi 
    
Oman 
    
Kuwait 
   
Bahrain 
   
Emirates 
 
Qatar 
   
                        
   Responsible business relationships   n: 8     n: 5     n: 5    n: 1    n: 31     n: 16    
      Tota  %   Tota  %   Tota  %   Tota  %   Tota  %   Tota  %  
      l     l     l     l     l     l    
1   The company monitors the programs and  3   37.5  3   60   3   60   1   100   14   45.1  11   68.7 
   performances of joint ventures and                                     
   consortia; in the case of policies and                                     
   practices that are inconsistent with its                                     
   own program, the enterprises should take                                     
   appropriate action. This can include:                                     
   requiring corrections of deficiencies in                                     
   the implementation of the program,                                     
   application of sanctions, or termination                                     
   of its participation in the joint venture or                                     
   consortium.                                     
2   Where the company is unable to ensure 1  12.5  1  20  0   0  0   0  2  6.4  1  6.25  
   that a joint venture or consortium has a                                     
   program consistent with its own, it                                     
   should have a plan to exit from the                                     
   arrangement if bribery occurs or is                                     
   reasonably thought to have occurred.                                     
3   The company ensures that remuneration  1   12.5  0  0   0   0   0   0   0   0  0   0  
   of agents is appropriate and for legitimate                                     
   services only. Where relevant, a list of                                     
   agents employed in connection with                                     
   transactions with public bodies and                                     
   state-owned enterprises should be kept                                     
   and made available to competent                                     
   authorities.                                     
4   The company contractually requires its 0  0  0  0  0   0  0     0  0  0  0  
   agents and other intermediaries to keep                                     
   proper books and records available for                       
0 
             
   inspections by the enterprise, auditors or                                    
                                       
   investigating authorities.                                     
5   The company monitors the conduct of its  2   25   3   60   2   40   1   100   13   41.9  4   25  
   agents and other intermediaries and                                     
   should have a right of termination in the                                     
   event that they bribe or act in a manner                                     
   inconsistent with the enterprise's                                     
   program.                                     
6   The company conducts its procurement 3  37.5  3  60  2   40  1   
100 
 13  41.9  10  62.5  
   practices in a fair and transparent                                    
                                       
   manner.                                     
7   The company makes known its anti-  0   0   3   60   2   40   1   100   11   35.4  3   18.7 
   corruption policies to contractors and                                     
   suppliers.                                     
8   The company monitors significant 3  37.5  2  40  2   40  1   100  14  45.1  6  37.5  
   contractors and suppliers as part of its                                     
   regular review of relationships with them                                     
   and has a right to terminate in the event                                     
   that they pay bribes or act in a manner                                     
   inconsistent with the enterprise's                                     
   program.                                     
9   The company reports the number of   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   2   6.4   2   12.5 
   contracts terminated.                                      
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Category 5: External verification and assurance. 
     Saudi     Oman     Kuwait    Bahrain    Emirates  Qatar    
  
External verification and assurance 
  n: 8     n: 5     n: 5    n: 1    n: 31     n: 16    
    
Tota 
 
% 
  
Tota 
 
% 
  
Tota 
 
% 
  
Tota 
 
% 
  
Tota 
 
% 
  
Tota 
 
% 
 
                      
     l     l     l     l     l     l    
1  The board or equivalent body should  0  0   0  0   0  0   0  0   4  12.9   0  0  
  consider whether to commission external                               
  verification or assurance of                               
  anticorruption policies and systems to                               
  provide enhanced internal and external                               
  assurance of the program's effectiveness.                               
2  Where such external verification or 0 0  0 0  0  0  0  0  2 6.4 0 0  
  assurance is conducted, the board or                               
  equivalent body should consider publicly                               
  disclosing that an external review has                               
  taken place, together with the related                               
  verification or assurance opinion.                               
3  Assurance statements explicitly cover 7 87.5  5 100  4  80  1  100  23 74.1  14 87.5  
  program reporting.                               
                                  
 
 
Category 6: Codes of conduct. 
    Saudi    Oman    Kuwait   Bahrain   Emirates Qatar    
  
Codes of conduct 
 n: 8    n: 5    n: 5   n: 1   n: 31    n: 16    
   
Tota 
 
% 
 
Tota 
 
% 
 
Tota 
 
% 
 
Tota 
 
% 
 
Tota 
 
% 
 
Tota 
 
% 
 
                
    l    l    l    l    l    l    
1  Establishment of Codes of Conduct  6 75  3 60  4  80 1  100 28 90.3  16 100  
  relates to corruption practices                          
                            
2  The Code of Conduct is effectively 6 75  3 60  4  80 1  100 25 80.6  11 68.7  
  communicated to the members of the                         
  organization                         
                       
3  Establishment of a monitoring 5 62.5  3 60  4  80 1  100 25 80.6  12 75  
  mechanism on the implementation of the                         
  Codes of Conduct                         
 
 
Category 7: Whistle-blowing. 
    Saudi    Oman    Kuwait   Bahrain   Emirates Qatar    
  
Whistle-blowing 
 n: 8    n: 5    n: 5   n: 1   n: 31    n: 16    
   
Tota 
 
% 
 
Tota 
 
% 
 
Tota 
 
% 
 
Tota 
 
% 
 
Tota 
 
% 
 
Tota 
 
% 
 
                
    l    l    l    l    l    l    
1  Existence of a whistle-blowing policy  3 37.5  1 20  3  60 0  0  13 41.9  4 25 
                            
2  Implementation of whistle-blowing 3 37.5  1 20  3  60 0  0  13 41.9  4 25 
  practices.                         
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